Weekly Market Update: Risk-on sentiment in markets despite weakening fundamentals

Weekly Market Update: Risk-on sentiment in markets despite weakening fundamentals

Mon 28 Mar 2022

It takes a confluence rather than individual risks to cause catastrophe, as any veteran of the Global Financial Crisis will attest. We believe that there’s a mounting  probability that we are seeing such a confluence of risks now, one that could significantly hurt growth:

  • A weak economic backdrop: Economies had barely recovered from the pandemic before the Ukraine war caused prices to spike.
  • Broad-based high inflation: Inflation in raw materials is much broader
  • Policy mistakes from central banks who might suffocate growth instead of combatting inflation
  • Policy mistakes from Government Treasuries who may opt for reducing debt instead of fostering growth
  • A possible ‘stealth’ Chinese slowdown.  China spent the last year trying to burst a Real Estate Bubble, both commercial and residential. The US (1996-2006), Spain (1985-2008), Japan (1985-1991) all experienced deep recessions immediately following the bursting of real estate bubbles. To the real estate pressures one must add higher energy costs, a clampdown on tech and other sectors, high municipal debt, wild demand fluctuations and a fresh Covid outbreak.

In this environment, we have to boldly state that we are not sure what the Fed means by suggesting it can “engineer a soft landing”. Even without the confluence of so many anti-growth factors, western economies are driven primarily by consumption, which means they are influenced by sentiment. Instead of keeping hopes up for just slower growth, the world should prepare for the possibility of a bona fide global economic recession. It could be slowed possibly by bank de-regulation or a swift Chinese economic rebound, however we have seen evidence of neither yet.

What does this mean for asset allocators?

First of all, we are raising the possibility of a significant slowdown in global growth, not the certainly. We think the scenario is gaining momentum, but a lot of the above conditions would have to play out at their current trajectory, at the same time for the scenario to materialise.

A global recession is a systemic event, which is bound to affect all assets. Maintaining cash is not a good choice in a high-inflationary environment. Stocks will suffer from slow growth, bonds from inflation and commodities from high volatility and speculation. As in 2008, this is probably a tunnel which all portfolios will have to go through.

The point of asset allocation is the belief that on any given major event, there’s high uncertainty. So we can’t accurately predict what will outperform and what will not. Marginal differences between portfolios from different vendors are as much the result of randomness as they are of foresight. No one strategy or manager has ever emerged that can outperform in any and all market environments. But by and large, those who remain invested with a diversified portfolio far much better than those who don’t, or those who attempt to time the market (despite all evidence suggesting that this is virtually impossible).

At its core, asset allocation is the belief that, in the face of all difficulties, capitalism adapts in a way to deliver returns. The point is not lost to those who clearly see the possibility of an economic recession, but the S&P 500 just 300 points shy of its all-time high.

The Titanic didn’t really just go down because of an iceberg. Evidence suggests that a fire was raging below deck for days, that the crew was unable to deal with. The fire may have weakened the hull and destroyed one or two key bulkheads so once the iceberg struck, the water quickly poured into the rest of the ship. It was thus that the “unsinkable” became very much submersible. Add J. Bruce Ismay’s criminal preference of marketing over passenger safety and the fact that the Captain of the SS California, which was only twenty miles away, chose to ignore the signal flares to go to sleep and one gets the picture of the perfect storm.

But people just remember the iceberg. When disaster strikes, we tend to focus on the one thing, as it makes for an easier story. However, humans usually are pretty good at managing individual risks. Economists use the “all things being equal principle” to analyse economic conditions and stress. Where we are challenged is when we have to imagine scenarios where many things go wrong, and one risk materialising reinforces another. It’s the third, or fourth order events that are difficult to fathom.

Yet it is, more often than not, it takes a confluence rather than individual risks to cause catastrophe, as any veteran of the Global Financial Crisis will attest.

We believe that there’s a mounting probability that we are seeing such a confluence of risks now, one that could significantly hurt growth:

A weak economic backdrop: Last year, policymakers assumed that supply chains were robust and global supply would quickly snap to when post-lockdown demand picked up. The only thing that snapped was factory capacity. Lead and delivery times grew significantly. As a result, orders multiplied because merchants wanted to build inventory. This led to chaos. Materials became scarce, delivery times grew exponentially and orders were simply left unfilled. This erratic demand pattern caused inflation to spike. Yet, in early February, nearly a year after vaccinations became available, we were seeing evidence of a nascent economic recovery. It was fragile and data was anything but conclusive, however the broader picture suggested a gradual reduction of stresses. In Europe, inflation pressures had shown evidence of peaking.

Broad-based high inflation. The war in Ukraine and the concomitant sanctions on Russia could not have come at a worst timing. Global supply chains were still very weak. Heavy sanctions on a key energy and materials provider will re-ignite inflation. The fact that these inputs are at the origin of supply chains exacerbates the problem, as the impact of shortages will branch out. Scarcity in energy affects almost every produce. Scarcity and high prices of wheat and corn mean that costs will go up throughout the food chain, affecting nearly all produces,  irrespectively of whether they are produced locally or they are imported.

This means that prices for meat, for example, will rise, even if the livestock comes from just a few miles away. Thus, unlike the previous inflationary bout, which focused on some sectors experiencing shortages, like cars, this one will see even higher prices and will be significantly more broad-based. That will be of particular consequence to lower income households across developed and emerging nations. In this environment, consumers will have to curtail costs. Because that will be difficult, with their employee hat, they will ask their employers to share their costs. Skilled labour shortages have moved pricing power to employees, thus by and large, average wages begin to grow. This increases the cost of goods produced, and manufacturers further raise their prices.

Policy mistakes: At this point, the economic rebound and inflation have become competing targets. This puts policy makers in a bind, raising the probability of policy mistakes on either side.

Central banks. Last year’s failure to predict inflation has caused panicked responses from central banks. Instead of studying the nature of current inflation, the US and UK central banks have embarked on a series of rate hikes, trying to emulate Paul Volcker’s 1981 experiment in hiking interest rates to curb inflation. However, conditions fourty years ago hardly resemble those today. For one, inflation in the seventies came after the abandonment of the gold standard and the introduction of fiat money. Inflation was to be expected. Oil shortages probably only served to exacerbate the problem. Our inflation is almost entirely supply driven, so strict rate policies may not apply. Second, debt levels, private and public, are very high, nearly triple of what they were in the 1980s. A lot of that debt will need refinancing. 20% interest rates, what history says was enough to curb inflation, is prohibitive with such debt overhang. More so, if governments wish to increase the stimulus to their economy, which would put central banks in the position of having to print money to buy that debt.

Third, the consumer dream has faded. Consumers have spent a decade being lectured how their mistakes led to the global financial crisis. Whether they espouse the argument or not, before the pandemic they would tend to save more rather than spend. We have no evidence that this behaviour has shifted. Neither do central banks.

Fourth, unemployment in the 1970s and 1980s was higher. Between 1970 and 1985 it averaged 6.9% in the US and 6.6% in the UK. Currently, it is at 3.8% and 3.9% respectively. Combined with lower labour participation rates post-pandemic this means that wage growth is driven by scarcity. As the pandemic normalises, we could expect to see participation raising and some labour pressure on inflation easing. This does not need central bank intervention to happen. Hybrid work and bills to support parents….

Central banks racing to raise interest rates, true to creed and presumed central mandate of price stability, will probably do little to curb supply-driven inflation. On the other hand, there’s a firm probability that they will hinder growth.  When the Fed hiked interest rates in 1981, it drove the economy into recession for nearly a year. In fact, nearly every time the Fed embarked on a series of rate hikes the economy suffered. In the early eighties, recovery was made able by gradually eroding the Glass-Steagal act, a law which prohibited banks from using deposits to invest in markets. The government was allowing banks to issue the money itself couldn’t. By doing that, banks were able to issue more debt, consumers and businesses got loans and the economy grew consistently for the first time in more than a decade. More legislation followed until the act was abolished in 1999.

However, this time around, there’s little chance of bank deregulation. Today’s Glass-Steagal is called the Volcker Rule. Repealing or modifying it is nowhere near the US government’s agenda. Thus, we have the first interest rate hike series in fifty years, with out commensurate easing in the US banking system. (Can’t wait to see how that one goes).

Fiscal policyis another consideration. Currently it is expansive. Governments were ready to incur another year or two of high debt to pay for the pandemic, but they were completely unready to deal with the fallout of the Ukrainian war and the economic impact of Russian sanctions. This was made apparent in the UK Spring Budget last week, when many commentators suggested that Chancellor Sunak should have deferred a national insurance tax rise when households were already under pressure from higher rates and inflation.

And, strange as it may sound, there’s still foreign policy to deal with. In the last few years, foreign and trade policy have been driven by an impulse to curb Chinese growth and influence. As a result, “trade wars “ erupted. In a global economy growing at 2.5%-3.5%, their impact was manageable. However, G7 and especially American foreign policy goals, which now focus on Russia but remain unchanged for China, are having a significantly higher effect on inflation and growth. Because these tariffs and barriers are political in nature, retracting or amending them is politically unpalatable.

And.. China

The final element for this recession perfect storm, but perhaps the most important, is the potential of a profound Chinese economic slowdown. Let us set official figures aside for a second. After all, official GDP growth has often been questioned because of its virtual linearity (as opposed to volatility for the rest of the globe), and its impeccable proximity to 5-year planned targets. And let us be sceptical about Chinese CPI at below 1%, when the rest of the world is experiencing 5% plus increases.

China spent the last year trying to burst a Real Estate Bubble, both commercial and residential. By some accounts, Real Estate directly influences about a third of its economy. The US (1996-2006), Spain (1985-2008), Japan (1985-1991) all experienced deep recessions immediately following the bursting of real estate bubbles. To the real estate pressures one must add higher energy costs, a clampdown on tech and other sectors, high municipal debt, wild demand fluctuations and a fresh Covid outbreak. In Hong Kong, Covid cases have risen significantly. Shanghai alone pledged to lock down millions to conduct mass testing. The global supply chain convulsions we experienced over the past year could well be attributed to a Chinese slowdown. And while the actual data to prove the assertion that China is slowing more than official figures suggest is scant, there’s ample of anecdotal evidence and data connected to Chinese output to tell a different story.

If the pandemic and Ukraine are the icebergs, China is the slow fire in the Titanic’s belly.

In this environment, we have to boldly state that we are not sure what the Fed means by suggesting it can “engineer a soft landing”. Even without the confluence of so many anti-growth factors, western economies are driven primarily by consumption, which means they are influenced by sentiment. Instead of keeping hopes up for just slower growth, the world should prepare for the possibility of a bona fide global economic recession. It could be slowed possibly by bank de-regulation or a swift Chinese economic rebound, however we have seen evidence of neither yet.

What does this mean for asset allocators?

First of all, we are raising the possibility of a significant slowdown in global growth, not the certainly. We think the scenario is gaining momentum, but a lot of the above conditions would have to play out at their current trajectory, at the same time for the scenario to materialise.

A global recession is a systemic event, which is bound to affect all assets. Maintaining cash is not a good choice in a high-inflationary environment. Stocks will suffer from slow growth, bonds from inflation and commodities from high volatility and speculation. As in 2008, this is probably a tunnel which all portfolios will have to go through.

The point of asset allocation is the belief that on any given major event, there’s high uncertainty. So we can’t accurately predict what will outperform and what will not. Marginal differences between portfolios from different vendors are as much the result of randomness as they are of foresight. No one strategy or manager has ever emerged that can outperform in any and all market environments. But by and large, those who remain invested with a diversified portfolio far much better than those who don’t, or those who attempt to time the market (despite all evidence suggesting that this is virtually impossible).

At its core, asset allocation is the belief that, in the face of all difficulties, capitalism adapts in a way to deliver returns. The point is not lost to those who clearly see the possibility of an economic recession, but the S&P 500 just 300 points shy of its all-time high.